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Scott. A Ostrow
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Abstract:
With increased opportunities for the exploitation (i.e., reverse engineering) of vulnerable electronic
components and systems, circuit protection has become a critical issue. Circuit protection techniques
are generally software-based and include cryptography (encryption/decryption), obfuscation of codes,
and software guards. Examples of hardware-based circuit protection include protective coatings on
integrated circuits, trusted foundries, and macro-sized components that self-destruct, thus destroying
critical components. This paper is the first to investigate the use of microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS) to provide hardware-based protection of critical electronic components to prevent reverse
engineering or other exploitation attempts. Specifically, surface-micromachined polycrystalline silicon to
be used as meandering resistive heaters were designed analytically and fabricated using a commercially
available MEMS prototyping service (i.e., PolyMUMPs), and integrated with representative components
potentially at risk for exploitation, in this case pseudomorphic high-electron mobility transistors
(pHEMTs). The MEMS heaters were initiated to self-destruct, destroying a critical circuit component and
thwart a reverse engineering attempt. Tests revealed reliable self-destruction of the MEMS heaters with
approximately 25 V applied, resulting in either complete operational failure or severely altering the
pHEMT device physics. The prevalent failure mechanism was metallurgical, in that the material on the
surface of the device was changed, and the specific failure mode was the creation of a short-circuit.
Another failure mode was degraded device operation due to permanently altered device physics related
to either dopant diffusion or ohmic contact degradation. The results, in terms of the failure of a targeted
electronic component, demonstrate the utility of using MEMS devices to protect.

SECTION I. Introduction
With increased opportunities for the exploitation of electronic systems, the use of circuit protection
methods has become vitally important.1,2 Attacks on systems and individual devices can include
physical/side-channel attacks and logical attacks. Physical attacks, which deal with exploiting the
implementation of a system, include invasive attacks such as microprobing and reverse engineering (RE),
and noninvasive attacks such as power analysis, electromagnetic analysis, timing attacks, and fault

induction.3 Logical attacks, which deal with observing the response of a system to stimuli, include
software attacks, such as viruses and exploiting crypto/protocol weaknesses in a system.3,4 Circuit
protection techniques are generally software-based and include cryptography (encryption/decryption),
obfuscation of codes, layouts and data flows, and software guards.5–6,7,8 Examples of hardware-based
circuit protection include protective coatings on integrated circuits, entire product enclosures, trusted
processors and foundries, and the introduction of complexity into circuit design and macro-sized selfdestructing components that protect critical circuits by destroying them prior to exploitation.5–6,7,9,10
Current state of the art in hardware-based circuit protection is passive camouflage of individual
components so that they visually appear to be another standard component (i.e., a nand gate looks like
a nor gate).11 This approach prevents RE when adversaries create logic flow diagrams directly from
physical circuits without actually applying power and measuring signals.
This paper presents the first-ever microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) resistive heater used as a
circuit protection device. Resistive heaters utilize the concepts of joule heating and thermal transfer,
when a voltage is applied, to heat up and/or burn out electronic components that they are placed or
fabricated on top of. The approach for this demonstration was to utilize a commercial MEMS fabrication
process to create prototype polycrystalline silicon meandering and spiral resistive heater devices and
test their effectiveness for providing circuit protection against RE via the self-destruction of critical
circuit components. We use unpackaged pseudomorphic high-electron-mobility transistors (pHEMTs) to
represent key circuit components potentially at risk for exploitation. pHEMTs were chosen because they
are high-performance devices, commonly used in military radio frequency (RF) systems, and are a
special form of modulation-doped field-effect transistors (MODFETs) or high-electron-mobility
transistors (HEMTs), where a thin lattice matching layer is used to isolate defects from the substrate.12
When considering the self-destruction or degradation of potentially exploitable components, the
electronic failure modes and failure mechanisms need to be considered.
Failure modes are the symptoms which highlight that a failure has occurred, typically seen in the
degradation or change in a device's response parameters—voltage, current, resistance, etc. Standard
failure modes are open circuits, short-circuits, functional failures, and degraded performance. These
failure modes can be influenced by a number of variables including, but not limited to, component
design and geometry, material doping levels, humidity, and temperature. Temperature is commonly
seen as the variable that has the biggest influence on inducing and increasing the likelihood of failure.
Failure mechanisms are the means by which a device or component degrades or stops working. These
mechanisms can be chemical, environmental, metallurgical, physical, or any combination of them.13,14 In
this paper, failure modes were triggered thermally by placing MEMS resistive heaters directly onto
devices potentially targeted for exploitation—in this case pHEMTs.

SECTION II. Targeted Device
The pHEMT device shown in Fig. 1, which was fabricated as part of an advanced semiconductor devices
course, was used to represent a vulnerable electronic component at risk for exploitation.

Fig. 1. Optical image showing a representative pHEMT device used in this paper. The surface damage
was a result of rapid thermal annealing during fabrication and did not affect the proper operation of the
device.

A. Background and Theory
Field-effect transistors (FETs) are widely used in switching and amplification applications. They are
characterized by having three terminals, where one terminal controls the flow of carriers (electrons or
holes) in the channel that links the other two terminals, thus controlling the current between those
terminals. In FETs, these terminals are referred to as the drain, source, and gate, with the gate being the
terminal that controls the flow of carriers from the source terminal to the drain terminal. This current is
controlled by a voltage at the gate and the formation of a gate capacitor, which creates the channel
between the other two terminals.14,15 FETs are classified at a high level by the formation of the gate
capacitor, with junction FETs (JFETs) utilizing the depletion layer in a p-n junction, metal–semiconductor
FETs (MESFETs) utilizing the depletion layer in a Schottky junction, and insulated-gate FETs (IGFETs)
using an insulator material. The pHEMT falls under the IGFET classification, which can be subdivided
further into metal–oxide–semiconductor FETs (MOSFETs), metal–insulator–semiconductor FETs
(MISFETs), and heterojunction FETs (HFETs). These classifications are based on how the insulator is
formed, with MOSFETs having an oxide layer grown as the insulator, MISFETs having a dielectric
deposited as the insulator, and HFETs having an insulator based on the deposition of a high-bandgap
material to form a heterojunction with the channel layer. The pHEMT falls under the HFET classification,
which is composed of MODFETs (i.e., HEMTs) and heterojunction insulated-gate FETs (HIGFETs). The
distinction between these two classifications is based on whether the high-bandgap material is doped
(MODFETs) or undoped (HIGFETs).
A standard way to assess the performance of an FET is through its current–voltage (I−V) characteristics,
which are derived from the basic operation of the device. By plotting the drain current ID versus the
drain voltage VD , and varying the gate voltage VG , a set of curves can be obtained to highlight this

operation, as shown in Fig. 2 for a pHEMT used in this paper. The data plotted was collected using an
Alessi REL-6100 probe station and the HP4155A semiconductor parameter analyzer.

Fig. 2. Graph showing a representative pHEMT baseline I−V characteristic collected using an Alessi REL6100 probe station and an HP4155A semiconductor parameter analyzer. These curves highlight that the
baseline prior to the placement of the self-destruct device is operating as designed.
At a specific applied gate voltage, the drain current will be proportional to the drain voltage over a range
of low VD values, referred to as the linear region. Eventually, there is a point where this linear
relationship breaks down, referred to as the nonlinear region, and the applied VD starts to cause the
channel at the drain end to shrink in size. What is known as pinch-off occurs when the channel is
essentially closed off at the drain end of the channel. Past this point is referred to as the saturation
region, and the drain current essentially remains constant even if the drain voltage is increased.15
Focusing further on the MODFET configuration, the high-bandgap material is doped, such as n-doped
AlGaAs, while the channel layer underneath is undoped, forming the heterojunction. A quantum well,
referred to as a two-dimensional electron gas (2-DEG), forms from the creation of this heterojunction, in
which electrons from the doped-layer conduction band diffuse toward the undoped layer. This occurs
because the doped layer has a wider energy bandgap than the undoped layer, and the shifting electrons
are confined to the 2-DEG region as a result of band bending. The formation of the 2-DEG results in a
channel that is free of impurity scattering, and as a result has high-mobility carriers traversing through
the channel. This is known as modulation doping and it is where MODFETs get their name from.12,14,15

B. PHEMT Fabrication
The pHEMT devices were fabricated on GaAs substrates with a thin epitaxial lattice-match layer of
Inx Ga1−x As between the GaAs substrate and the AlGaAs layer to increase electron mobility. A
straightforward three-mask process based on standard fabrication steps were followed, resulting in
pHEMT devices with T-shaped gates.16

SECTION III. Protection Device
In this paper, MEMS meandering and spiral resistive heaters are examined as circuit protection devices
for pHEMTs. The design concept was to disrupt device operation and/or alter device physics by
generating a sufficiently high temperature gradient directly on top of an unpackaged pHEMT. The
background, design, and fabrication of the MEMS devices are discussed next.

A. Background and Theory
Thermal, or heat, transfer occurs when a temperature gradient exists in a material. The mechanisms for
heat transfer are thermal conduction, natural thermal convection, forced thermal convection, and
radiation. Typically, when considering MEMS devices, conduction is emphasized, while radiation and
convection are de-emphasized since most often the devices are hermetically sealed. If the MEMS
devices are not sealed, convection would require more consideration.17,18
Thermal conduction involves the movement of heat in a solid as a result of a temperature gradient. It is
characterized by the agitation of molecules in a material, with energy transferring from fast moving
particles to slower moving particles, while the material itself remains motionless.17,18
The heat transfer takes place in the direction of the negative of the temperature gradient, moving from
a high to a low temperature. The thermal conductivity and temperature gradient, therefore, will
determine the rate of heat transfer for a particular material.18
Thermal transfer is dictated by the thermal resistance of the material. The higher the thermal resistance,
the lower the heat transfer rate, which results in greater thermal isolation. Thermal resistance is the
ratio of the temperature difference to the heat flow, and is analogous to electrical resistance in the
following form:
(1)

𝑅𝑅 = 𝜌𝜌 × (𝑙𝑙/𝐴𝐴)

where ρ is the electrical resistivity, l is the length, and A is the surface area of a resistor. The power loss
associated with a current flowing through a resistor is
(2)

𝑃𝑃 = 𝐼𝐼2 × 𝑅𝑅

where I is the current and R is the resistance. This power loss is also referred to as joule or ohmic
heating.17
Resistors are simple multifunctional devices that can be used for biasing electronic components as well
as functioning as test structures for evaluating material properties. They are adaptable because they can
be fabricated from a wide range of materials, such as polysilicon, diffused bulk silicon, silicon-oninsulator (SOI), and dielectrics, as well as with a range of applications, such as thermal sensors, resistive
heaters, and piezoresistors. The resistance of a fabricated resistor is determined by its length, width,
thickness, resistivity, sheet resistance, and the quality of material it is made of.13
Meandering resistors are compact and typically used when linear resistors would negatively impact
circuit designs due to limited design space or fabrication area. A concern for square meandering

resistors, however, is that the current density at each corner block or bend is not evenly distributed and
therefore contributes less to the overall resistance, and so a correction factor is required.20 Equation (3)
accounts for this effect and is used to predict the resistance of square meandering resistive heaters
(3)

𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅s × (𝑁𝑁 + (𝑘𝑘 ′ × 𝑁𝑁cb ))

where R is the overall resistance, Rs is the sheet resistance, N is the number of subcomponent
blocks in the straight sections, k ′is the corner block correction factor, and Ncb is the number of
corner blocks.20

B. MEMS Heater Design
The following were the primary considerations for this demonstration: 1) use a well understood
surrogate device for the demonstration; 2) use a resistive heater to generate a sufficiently large thermal
gradient for disrupting device operation or altering device physics; and 3) allow for postmortem analysis
and investigation. pHEMTs were used to address consideration 1, while MEMS devices were used to
address considerations 2 and 3.
Specifically, MEMS heaters were designed to maximize the pHEMT surface area, reach the maximum
temperature with a 25 V circuit protect signal applied, and minimize potential resistor hot spot failures
due to current crowding. Two heater variations were designed to address the surface area design
constraint and the current crowding concern. The square meandering resistors, designed using (3),
provided a compact design with the highest surface area coverage and consisted of 17 arms (500
μm long, 20 μm wide) with 10-μm gaps between the arms. Current crowding (common in the corner
blocks of meandering resistors) and premature device failure concerns inspired the circular or spiral
resistor variation that was designed using (1). The circular geometry (∼350 μm overall radius) was
investigated to minimize potential current crowding effects by using a relatively large radius of curvature
structure. In both design variations, a 1.5-μm -thick, polysilicon layer with known resistivity
(∼33.3 Ω⋅cm) and sheet resistance (∼22 Ω/□) was used. The corresponding resistance of each resulting
structure (square and spiral) was approximately equal (i.e., ∼650 Ω). Finally, the use of MEMS heaters
for this demonstration facilitated heater removal and allowed reliable postmortem analysis of the
pHEMT devices.

C. MEMS Heater Fabrication
The Polysilicon MultiUser MEMS Process (PolyMUMPs) is a commercially available polycrystalline silicon
(i.e., polysilicon) surface micromachining process that offers two releasable polysilicon layers and one
layer fixed to the substrate. The process consists of 12 photolithography mask steps and consists of
seven total layers all fabricated on top of a <100> oriented n-type silicon wafer.21 The first layer, namely
silicon nitride, is used for electrical isolation between the substrate and the subsequent polysilicon
mechanical layers. The oxide films (two in total) are the sacrificial layers, while the polysilicon films
(three in total) are the structural and fixed layers. The final evaporated gold layer is for electrical contact
pads, electrical wiring, and creating reflective surfaces.21
Devices with and without probe pads were designed and fabricated using PolyMUMPs. The devices with
probe pads were tested on chip by applying a voltage across the device to characterize how the MEMS

device initiated and eventually burned out or self-destructed. The devices without probe pads were
designed with smaller anchors; so, once released, they could be manually detached from the die using a
micromanipulator probe station. Once detached, the center of the heater was placed over the transistor
gate region, using a probe, and optically aligned using fabrication alignment marks and other device
features. The meandering heaters were easily aligned, whereas the spiral heaters proved more
challenging to align on top of the pHEMTs. Although this manual technique of heater placement was
effective for this proof-of-concept demonstration and postmortem analyses, an automated flip-bonding
approach would be needed for manufacturing actual integrated circuits protected using this method.
Figs. 3 and 4 show scanning electron microscopy (SEM) images, prior to on-chip testing, of a square
meandering and a spiral resistive heater, respectively.

Fig. 3. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a meandering resistive heater with probe pads for
testing and characterization prior to integration with a pHEMT device.

Fig. 4. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a polycrystalline silicon spiral heater fabricated with
a metal layer that was not completely lifted off, thus highlighting the prototyping nature of the
PolyMUMPs process.
Fig. 4 also shows a portion of the metal layer in the center of the spiral heater that was not completely
lifted off during fabrication, thus highlighting the prototyping nature of the PolyMUMPs process.
Fig. 5 shows an example of a square meandering resistive heater that was removed from a PolyMUMPs
die and placed on top of a surrogate pHEMT device.

Fig. 5. Optical picture of a square meandering resistive heater placed on a surrogate pHEMT. The
meandering prototype heater was removed from a PolyMUMPs chip and placed on top of the pHEMT
device.

SECTION IV. Test Results and Discussion
Prior to the circuit protection demonstration, individual meandering (see Fig. 3) and spiral (see Fig. 4)
heater devices, with probe pads, were extensively tested by applying dc voltages and characterized
using an OptoTherm micro-thermal imaging system. As expected, the effect of applying a dc selfdestruct signal similarly caused catastrophic damage to both meandering and circular resistive heaters.
Additionally, no thermal image hot spots, due to current crowding in the meandering resistor corner
blocks, were observed.
Next, unmodified pHEMT devices were tested and baselined in terms of their measured
I−V characteristics as shown in Fig. 2. Finally, pHEMT devices were fitted with meandering resistive
heaters and spiral resistive heaters.
The modified pHEMT devices were then tested, before applying the circuit protect signal, to verify
baseline functionality, and then again after removing the resistive heaters, to verify pHEMT damage. The
meandering heaters, shown in Fig. 6, self-destructed and evaporated with the application of
approximately 25 V.

Fig. 6. Optical image and postmortem analysis of a meandering resistive heater that was stuck on top of
a pHEMT device after ignition. A voltage was applied to the meandering heater, which caused it to heat
up and burn out, resulting in permanently altered device physics of the underlying pHEMT device.
In each case, the pHEMT devices failed and no longer exhibited useable performance, based on
I−V characteristic results. The initiation of the heaters either short-circuited the device terminals or
permanently altered the physics of the component, thus destroying normal functionality of the targeted
circuit. During postmortem analyses (after removing the MEMS heaters), it was discovered that initiated
MEMS heaters primarily caused short-circuits across the device terminals. Figs. 7 and 8 are SEM images
highlighting a short-circuit across the drain–gate–source of a representative pHEMT device. Additionally,
Fig. 8 clearly shows the depletion, migration, and accumulation of material.

Fig. 7. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of the effects of initiating of a meandering resistive
heater on a pHEMT device. A short-circuit, labeled above, was formed across the drain–gate–source of
the pHEMT.

Fig. 8. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a short-circuited pHEMT as a result of operating a
meandering resistive heater self-destruct sequence. The image shows that material has migrated from
the drain to the gate and the source, thus causing a short-circuit.
Fig. 9 is an example of severely degraded device physics characterized by a significantly altered
I−V characteristic after the initiation of a spiral heater.

Fig. 9. pHEMT I−V characteristics after initiation and removal of a MEMS spiral resistive heater. There is
obvious degradation in device physics, with spikes in the drain current as well as the complete loss of
drain current at higher voltages and operating points.
It is apparent from the I−V characteristics, shown in Fig. 9, that the pHEMT was not operating as it did
before the spiral heater was initiated. Unlike most of the results, however, the data shown in Fig. 9 did
not result in the complete operational failure of a pHEMT device, but rather permanently altered the
physics of the device. Potential failure mechanisms for the device illustrated by Fig. 8 include, but are
not limited to, unintended diffusion of dopants, degradation of ohmic contacts in the device terminals,
and electromigration.14 Regardless of the exact pHEMT failure mechanism, the targeted circuitry was
again protected by the heater protection circuit.
The results of this demonstration clearly show that by using a MEMS-based self-destruct component, in
this case a resistive heater, on top of an electronic component, in this case a pHEMT, the functionality of
an otherwise functional component can be completely destroyed, thus protecting targeted circuitry
from exploitation.

SECTION V. Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how MEMS-based self-destruct components, such as meandering square
or spiral resistive heaters, can be effectively used as circuit protection devices for preventing system
exploitation. This was evidenced by pHEMT devices failing to operate properly after meandering and
circular heaters were placed on top of the device and initiated using a 25 V circuit protect signal. The
advantage of this method is that, by altering device physics or destroying functionality of an individual
component, an entire circuit can be protected from RE. In other words, when RE is accomplished, the
observed circuit functionality will not be correct because key devices, within the circuit, are not
operating properly. This hardware-based approach to circuit protection ensures that intellectual
property and mission-critical data are not compromised. Future research will focus on directly
fabricating MEMS self-destruct components onto very large scale integrated circuits.
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